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  Abstract 
 
The major goal of this study was analyze the effect of “credibility” shocks to the dynamics 
of inflation persistence in 20 countries using quarterly data for the period 1980-1998. To address 
this topic, we used recently developed heterogeneous panel time series methods and found that 
central bank credibility, as inferred from the black market premium, impacted the degree of 
inflation persistence associated with central bank interventions and that the magnitude of this effect 
was correlated with the degree of central bank autonomy.  
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1. Introduction 
There is a common recognition that a black market for exchange rate emerges out of 
government restrictions on holding foreign assets. These restrictions lead to a rise in unofficial 
trade at prices that more accurately reflect actual supply and demand conditions (Agenor, 1992). 
Inefficient intervention of Central Bank (CB) to market can even distort the behavior of market 
agents leading to an increase in the spread between black market and official rate, called black 
market premium. Therefore, a significant spread between black market and official rate may be a 
signal of macroeconomic misalignment, and consequently central banks will often intervene in the 
official market to eliminate the spread (Miguel and O’Connel, 1995). This implies that the 
dynamics of black market premium can be considered to reflect the general public confidence to 
the performance of economy, as well as CB monetary policy.  
In that sense, the problem of beliefs towards CB monetary policy lies on asymmetric 
information that arises between the central bank (CB) and the public. When CB conducts its 
monetary policy public has little information on further actions of CB and policymakers 
commitment to it. One way to show its commitment is to undertake a strategy that could be clearly 
observed by the public like central bank independence or fixed exchange rate, which are argued to 
be more costly to renege from rather than to revoke from a simple commitment (Keefer and 
Stasave, 2002). A large body of theoretical and empirical studies emphasizes the importance of 
this asymmetry in effectiveness of disinflation programs (Kydland and Prescot,1977;  Backus D. 
and Driffil, 1985; Agenor and Taylor, 1993; Ball, 1990 ). The main argument is that when the 
public believes that the disinflation will be in fact carried out, the costs of disinflation program 
will be smaller (McCallum, 1997). In the literature, “public believes” toward monetary policy 
refers to “credibility” of monetary policy.  
Beginning from the 1980s, due to increasing role of oil prices on general economic 
environment, in most countries, the reduction of inflation was costly in terms of recession and 
increases in unemployment rates (David et al., 1990). While disinflationary policies were costly, 
the central banks started to lose credibility, therefore, when a disinflationary program lacks 
credibility, agents anticipate resumption in inflation (Agenor and Taylor, 1993). The argument was 
developed by Kydland and Prescot (1977) who introduced the concept of credibility of 
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implemented policies. They claimed that the public assigns a probability to policymakers’ 
commitments to reach some policy targets, and therefore, low credibility rather than irrational 
decision-making might explain the highly persistent inflation in an economy. 
Hence, the effectiveness of stabilization program depends on the role of credibility factors. 
When policies implemented lack credibility, private agents would eventually recognize that the 
government efforts to maintain a consistent set of policies over time would not be successful and 
the announced disinflation program would not be sustainable in the long-run. On the other hand, 
when the public is confident in the ability of policymakers to carry out a newly announced 
stabilization program, the inflationary process will be reduced by changing inflationary 
expectations. Since inflationary expectations have a significant effect on current wage and price 
decisions, a reduction in the actual inflation may result. (David et al., 1990). 
These arguments imply that lack of credibility of monetary policy is one of the major 
challenges for Central Banks to keep inflation low and stable in order to maintain financial stability 
and promote high growth. Moreover, there is a general recognition in academic and empirical 
literature that the primary goal for monetary policy is price stability. Other objectives such as 
promoting growth and employment are seen as secondary. The rationale is that the best way that a 
central bank can promote growth and employment is by keeping inflation low and stable. In that 
context, credibility becomes a central issue in disinflation programs as well as for monetary policy.  
Therefore, the major goal of this study is analyze the effect of “credibility” shocks to the 
dynamics of inflation in 20 countries using quarterly data for the period 1980-1998 by employing 
two different econometric techniques.  In the first part of the analysis we apply Kalman filter 
techniques following Agenor and Taylor (1993) methodology. The key idea of their analysis was 
to observe credibility of disinflation program in inflation persistence dynamics.   
In the second part of my analysis we apply heterogeneous vector autoregressive (VAR) panel 
technique following Pedroni (2008) and Pedroni (2013). The main motivation to employ VAR 
analysis is to build analysis based on multivariate context, while Kalman Filter methodology of 
Agenor and Taylor (1993) restricted on univariate form. Another reason to apply VAR approach 
is to analyze inflation in terms of different type of shocks, particularly to observe whether 
credibility shocks differ from inflation shocks.  
The remaining part of the thesis consists of the following sections. In Literature Review section 
we review some existing literature on credibility role in monetary policy and existing mythologies 
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to measure it. In Methodology section we discuss about measurement problem of credibility, and 
the econometric methodology to be applied, as well as data description. In Empirical Results 
section will discuss about econometric estimation results of the theory. In Conclusion section we 
summarized the main results. In addition, Appendix contains some results of econometric test 
statistics and graphs.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
It is generally recognized that the source of credibility lies in the time inconsistency of 
optimal policies (Kydland and Prsecott 1977). Time-inconsistency in monetary policy arises from 
a policymaker's futile attempt to stimulate output above the natural level, resulting in an 
inflationary bias under discretionary monetary policy. The standard explanation of this inflationary 
bias is based on a two-way interaction between policymakers and a rational public within the 
context of expectations-augmented Phillips curve in a game-theoretic approach. Under discretion, 
policymakers try to create inflation surprises in order to push employment above its natural level 
towards the higher desired level. However, individuals understand the temptation of policymakers 
and correctly forecast inflation, neutralizing any effect of inflation on employment. As a 
consequence, employment remains at its natural level but inflation bias arises. This is a dynamic 
inconsistency of optimal monetary policy under discretion (Kydland and Prsecott 1977, Barro and 
Gordon 1983). 
A large body of literature has been developed to examine alternative solutions to the 
inflationary bias of time-inconsistent monetary policy under discretion (Rogoff (1985), 
Canzonery(1985), Flood & Isard (1989), Lohmann (1992), Walsh (1995), McCallum (1995,1997), 
Svensson (1997)). Rogoff (1985) analyzes the preferences of the central bank to solve the time-
inconsistency problem and suggests that the government should appoint a "conservative" central 
banker who places greater relative weight on the inflation objective than does society (the 
government) as a whole. In other words, the government should delegate responsibility for 
monetary policy to an independent central bank. An independent central bank is able to set policy 
to minimize its own assessment of social costs. Thus, the inflation bias problem is solved through 
delegation. 
Lohmann (1992) showed that the government can do even better if it appoints a weight-
conservative central banker but limits the central bank's independence. Rogoff's solution highlights 
a trade-off; central bank can reduce the inflation bias but only at the cost of distorting stabilization 
policy. According to the Lohmann (1992), if the aggregate supply shock turns out to be too large, 
the central banker should respond more actively to large shocks in order to reduce the deadweight 
loss induced by this distortion. But in normal times, the monetary authority should follow the 
simple zero-inflation rule. 
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Walsh (1995) states that, the most convenient way to determine an optimal incentive 
structure is to assume that the government can offer the head of the central bank a state-contingent 
wage contract. Such a contract allows one to derive explicitly the manner in which the bank's 
incentives should depend on the state of the economy, namely output fluctuations and inflation 
variability. Presenting the central bank with this incentive contract achieves the dual objectives of 
eliminating the inflationary bias while still ensuring optimal stabilization policy in response to the 
central bank's private information about the aggregate supply shock. Thus, a state-contingent wage 
contract for the central banker allows central bank to eliminate the inflationary bias while ensuring 
optimal stabilization policy. 
Nevertheless, there are some other reasons that can cause credibility problem of policy 
authority other than time inconsistency problem. If policymakers target the normal level of 
employment, an inflationary bias arises if they are uncertain about economic conditions and are 
more sensitive to employment below than above normal level. This view implies a positive 
association between inflation and the variance of output shocks (Cukierman and Gerlach 2003). 
According to Cukierman and Gerlach (2003), in the absence of a Kydland--Prescott-Barro--
Gordon (hereinafter KPBG) type inflation bias, the use of monetary policy to stabilize shocks to 
the natural level of employment may lead to an inflation bias even if policymakers are satisfied 
with the potential level of employment so that the KPBG inflation bias is non-existent. Some 
uncertainty about the future state of the economy and asymmetric concerns about positive and 
negative output gaps combine to create an inflation bias. This result obtains in spite of the fact that 
the central bank's desired level of economic activity is equal to potential output or normal 
employment (Cukierman and Gerlach 2003:543). 
Tambakis (2004) states that, when the short-term Phillips curve is nonlinear and convex, 
the KPBG inflation bias is positive even when monetary policy credibly pre-commits to target the 
natural rate, the central banks preferences are quadratic and symmetric, and there is no future 
uncertainty. In a stochastic convex economy, average unemployment is always above the natural 
rate and is increasing in inflation variability. It follows that average inflation and unemployment 
move together, the mean inflation rate is higher when inflation is more volatile. 
As a result, credibility problem can arise not only from time-inconsistency of optimal plans 
but also from other reasons, such as uncertainty about the future state of the economy even if 
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central bank's desired level of economic activity is equal to potential output and the feature of 
short-term convex Phillips curve in the economy. 
Kremers (1990) analyzes Ireland's inflation experience after its participation in European 
Monetary System (EMS) and concludes that the participation in a fixed but adjustable exchange 
rate system with a group of low-inflation countries caused inflation expectations to be brought 
down in Ireland. According to the paper, a semi-fixed exchange rate policy may provide a source 
of discipline enhancing credibility of disinflation and reduces its detrimental impact (i.e. output 
loss) on the economy. 
Rodriguez et al. (2008) provide an overview of several studies about the credibility of three 
of the weakest currencies that participated in the EMS (the Spanish peseta, the Portuguese escudo, 
and the Irish pound), as well as to present a joint analysis of credibility of weak and hard currencies. 
According to the paper, the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) facilitated the necessary process of 
disinflation and that it raised the costs of inflation in the EMS. The aim of ERM was to provide 
discipline to macroeconomic policies that would ensure that fiscal deficits would not be 
compounded by monetary expansions. In these matters, Germany emerged almost naturally as the 
anchor for exchange rate and inflation expectations. In fact, the ERM could be seen as an 
institutional arrangement which has enabled the member countries to borrow the reputation of the 
Bundesbank by pegging their exchange rates to the Deutschmark. In this way, weaker currencies 
achieved a greater degree of credibility due to the existence of reputation effects within the ERM. 
In other words, EU member states with histories of high inflation used the EMS as a way of 
importing the Bundesbank's anti-inflationary credibility.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
The major focus of this study is on the responses of inflation to the black market premium 
shocks, interpreted as credibility shocks, in selected countries. In order to address this question we 
applied two different econometric techniques. By applying Kalman filter following Agenor and 
Taylor (1993) we tried to observe credibility of monetary policy by looking at inflation persistence. 
The key idea of their analysis was to observe credibility of disinflation program in inflation 
persistence dynamics. However, they use univariate time-series analysis to evaluate credibility 
effects, which could be difficult to distinguish between changes in the goodness-of-fit of the time-
series model generating expectations and changes in the credibility of policy, because potentially 
relevant variables are excluded from the model.  Therefore, we employ Cholesky reduced form 
panel vector autoregressive (VAR) approach in multivariate context following Pedroni (2008) and 
Pedroni (2013).  This will allow us to analyze the response of inflation to different type of shocks, 
as well as to calculate variance decomposition. Another advantage also of this technique is that, it 
excludes fixed country effects from the dynamics and allows among dynamics of individual 
country responses to be heterogonous among all the countries. 
3.1. Kalman Filter technique 
Agenor and Taylor (1993) applied Kalman Filter technique to study the credibility effect 
of the Cruzado Plan implemented in Brazil in 1986. The procedure followed by the authors was 
based on the existence of the official foreign exchange rate and the black market or parallel 
exchange rate market in Brazil. The authors' considerations were based on the exchange rate 
markets. They consider that if a disinflationary program lacks of credibility, agents anticipate the 
acceleration in the inflation rate. 
The model is built on two assumptions: The first assumption is that inflation is, because of 
inertial forces, a serially correlated process. Expectations play a key role in breaking down 
inflationary inertia. Moreover, the degree of inflation persistent is assumed to be inversely related 
to the degree of policy credibility. 
The second assumption is related with the definition of an appropriate proxy that is able to 
measure the degree of credibility of a program, or generally an economic policy that can stabilize 
the level of inflation. This proxy is given by that part of the parallel market premium, which is 
orthogonal to movements in the 'market fundamentals'. Parallel market premium is defined as 
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difference of exchange rates is based on the assumption that it is highly sensitive to market 
expectations regarding government policies, and therefore, is considered a good variable for 
examining credibility effects. The idea is to consider how the spread given by the change in the 
two exchange rates to an announced stabilization program. Hence, we assume that the black market 
exchange rates are highly sensitive to the change in credibility. Since the parallel market premium 
is influenced by the private agents' expectations regarding current and future economic policies, 
the analysis of its behavior is crucial to the study of credibility factors which are affected by 
changes in expectations. The market premium, that is the difference between official and black 
market exchange rates, is an endogenous variable. This means that its level will also reflect the 
behavior of market fundamentals, such as economic growth, past domestic inflation, money 
growth etc.  
If movements in the parallel premium cannot be explained by movements in the market 
fundamentals, such as economic growth, past domestic inflation, money growth, then the 
remaining variation must be due to variation in the perceived degree of policy credibility. In other 
words, all the variations in that part of the parallel market will be strongly influenced by the level 
of reputation and credibility gained by the authorities. 
The model can be divided into two parts. The first part consists of decomposing the parallel 
market premium ( 𝜌𝑡) into two components: the 'fundamental component' and 'non fundamental 
component' which will be the basis for a measure of credibility. The fundamental component of 
parallel market premium reflects the behavior of market fundamentals. Non fundamental 
component of parallel market premium, which is orthogonal to movements in the fundamental 
component, will be heavily influenced by perceptions of policy credibility so that it can be used as 
an index of credibility. 
If we denote parallel market premium ( 𝜌𝑡 ) and predetermined fundamental factors ( 𝑧𝑡 ), 
the general form of the model is as follows: 
𝑎(𝐿)𝜌𝑡 = 𝑏(𝐿)𝑧𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡       (1) 
𝑎(𝐿) = 1 + 𝑎1 𝐿 +  𝑎2𝐿
2 + 𝑎3𝐿
3+. . . +𝑎𝑘𝐿
𝑘     (2) 
𝑏(𝐿) = 𝑏1 𝐿 + 𝑏2𝐿
2 + 𝑏3𝐿
3+. . . +𝑏𝑘𝐿
𝑘     (3) 
10 
 
Where ta  represents a scalar coefficient, the  𝑏𝑡  denotes conformable coefficient vectors, 
L is the lag operator, and  𝑢𝑡  the residual process. After rearranging we get: 
𝜌𝑡 = 𝑎1 𝜌𝑡−1+. . . + 𝑎𝑘 𝜌𝑡−𝑘 + 𝑏1 𝑧𝑡−1+. . . + 𝑏𝑘𝑧𝑡−𝑘 + 𝑢𝑡   (4) 
Equation (4) can be interpreted as the first equation in a vector autoregressive system for 
parallel market premium. The residuals from the equation (4) we derive our credibility shocks 
( 𝑐𝑡 ).
2 We believe that such a specification captures the agents’ beliefs about monetary policy. It 
is assumed to be the complement of the error term 𝑢𝑡 : 
  𝑐𝑡 = −𝑢𝑡  (5) 
In addition, it could reasonable to argue that intercept of ARDL3  system from equation (4) 
can be interpreted as an average level of CB credibility. In fact, time invariant intercept is an 
average level of market premia conditional on the past information of fundamental. We will use it 
to explain the reason of variations in credibility across countries. 
In the second part of the model, using a Kalman filter approach, a backward-looking4 
process for inflation with parameters varying with non-fundamental component of the parallel 
market premium are estimated. Harvey (1989) argues that the key to handling structural time series 
models is the state space form, with the state of the system representing the various unobserved 
components such as trends and seasonal. Once in the state space form, the Kalman filter provides 
the means of updating the state as new observations become available. Assuming that 
inflation,  𝜋𝑡 , is given by a AR(1) process, the system to be estimated is given by 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡    (6) 
𝛼𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑐𝑡 + 𝜗𝑡   (7) 
Where (6) is the measurement equation with  𝜋𝑡  and  𝜀𝑡  are (nx1) vectors and (7) is the 
transition equation.   𝛼𝑡   and  𝜗𝑡  (nx1) are vectors and is a  𝑐𝑡  (nx1) matrix. It is assumed that all 
                                                          
2 Agenor and Taylor (1992) expressed  𝑐𝑡  as a credibility variable. However, due to presence of stochastic 
characteristics it can be considered as shocks rather than variable. 
3 We omitted from the equation (4) for simplicity. 
4 As Strum (2009) showed that forward-looking model is better in price-level targeting models than 
forward-looking models. Since, in our sample (198Q1-1998Q4) many of the countries was adopting 
between fixed and heavily managed exchange rate regimes, this consistent with Strum (2009) argument.  
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errors are normally distributed and E( 𝜀𝑡 𝜗𝑡 )=0  for all t. Equations (6) and (7) represent a state 
space form. 
Finally, following the theory of Agenor and Taylor (1993) the Kalman filter recursions can 
then be applied to yield optimal estimates of the state variable sequence 𝛼𝑡 . The resulting estimate 
of 𝛾 should be negative: the higher credibility is, the lower the inertial effect on inflation. The 
coefficient  𝛼𝑡  of the equation (7) should be smaller after the accomplishment of a credible 
disinflation program. 
Note that, this method seems suitable for low and moderate inflation, whose series 
normally are stationary. However, high and chronic inflation series tend to be non-stationary due 
to a higher degree of persistence. This being the case such a method can lead to inconsistent 
coefficient estimates.  
3.2. Reduced Form Panel VAR 
Due to univariate structure of Kalman Filter technique in Agenor and Taylor methodology 
makes difficult to distinguish between changes in the goodness-of-fit of the time-series model 
generating expectations and changes in the credibility of policy. By applying Cholesky reduced 
form panel vector autoregressive (VAR) following Pedroni (2008) and Pedroni (2013) we expect 
to overcome this problem. In a sense that it will allow us to analyze inflation persistence in terms 
of different type of shocks, particularly to observe whether credibility shocks differ from inflation 
shocks. 
Hence, the following questions would be relevant to answer: How much credibility shock 
differ from inflation shock? How much credibility shock explains endogenous variations in 
inflation? These questions are the main reasons for employing panel VAR analysis.  
During 1980 and 1990 world experienced some important structural changes in 
macroeconomic level as well as in monetary policy. These changes were regional as well as global. 
It is important to take into consideration the fact that individual countries are likely to be linked 
cross-sectional via common global and regional shocks. Therefore, heterogeneity exists in 
monetary policies during this period. The presence of heterogeneity makes conventional dynamic 
panel methods not appropriate, due to fact that they require the dynamics of individual country 
responses to be identical among all countries. For the second part of paper we used the Cholesky 
reduced form VAR methodology developed in Pedroni (2008) and Pedroni (2013). 
12 
 
The VAR model is then given by the following system of equations:5 
∆𝑧𝑡 = 𝛤0 + ∑ 𝛤𝑖
𝑝𝑖
𝑖=1
∆𝑧𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 
Where ∆𝑧𝑡 = (∆𝑝𝑡 ∆𝑔𝑡 ∆𝑚𝑡 ∆𝑟𝑡)
′ matrix of endogenous variables premium, output 
growth, money growth and inflation6;  𝛤0 is a matrix of constants, 𝜇𝑡 = (𝜇𝑝𝑡  𝜇𝑔𝑡  𝜇𝑚𝑡  𝜇𝑖𝑡)
′ matrix 
of innovations to premium, output growth, money growth and to inflation respectively, with 
𝐸(𝜇𝑡) = 0, and covariance matrix 𝐸(𝜇𝑡𝜇𝑠
′ ) = Ω𝜇. Thus, a vector autoregression is a system in 
which each variable is expressed as a function of own lags as well as lags of each of the other 
variables. To get orthogonalized impulse response and variance decomposition we applied 
Cholesky decomposition (triangularization) Ω𝜇 = 𝐿𝐿
′, where L is known as the Cholesky 
decomposition matrix for Ωμ, and then accumulated the impulse responses to see the effects of the 
shocks on the levels of the variables7. A key quantity for our analysis is the cumulative impulse 
response function (IRF). An IRF measures the time profile of the effect of perturbations on the 
expected future values of variables in a dynamical system. The advantages of using this approach 
is that, with panel data we can control for factors that could cause omitted variable bias if they are 
omitted, also we can control unobserved or unmeasured unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
3.3. Data description 
The most the quarterly data for Kalman Filter and panel VAR estimation taken from 
International Financial Statistics of the IMF over the period from 1980 to 1998 years.8 The 
countries are chosen based on availability of quarterly data, finally we could estimate just for 20 
countries.9 The list of countries and time periods used in the study is provided in the appendix. 
The variables which we refer to market fundamentals are Real GDP, M110 Money 
aggregate, Consumer Price Index (CPI).11 
Parallel market premium is a main indicator for measuring credibility, and calculated as a 
                                                          
5 To choose lag length for reduced form VAR we used Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC).  
6 We used the same market fundamentals as Kalman Filter technique. 
7 See Pedroni (2008) and Pedroni (2013) for details on the identification and computation of the impulse 
response form and the decomposition of shocks into regional versus national in panels. 
8 See more detail in Table 4 in Appendix. 
9 Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark,  France, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherland, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,  South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey. 
10 For some countries due to absence of M1 money aggregate instead we used M2 or M3. 
11 See data description Appendix B table 5. 
13 
 
difference between logarithmic black and official exchange. The reason for calculation of premium 
in a way is to avoid minus signs in premium.12 The data on black market and official exchange 
rate taken from Carmen Reinhart’s web-site. 
Central Bank Independence Index taken from Arnone et al. (2007). They combined two 
studies of Cuckierman(1992) and Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). Their study provides 
three type of Independence index: Political Independence, Economic Independence and Overall 
Independence. In our analysis we used all three types of indices.  
                                                          
12 The negative sign of premium can be seen confusing. One of the reasonable explanation for that, a 
negative premium may have emerged during periods when commercial banks have been forbidden to buy 
foreign currency without properly identification of the seller; in such circumstances, a negative premium 
represents a “laundering charge” (Dornbusch et al. 1983)  
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section addresses stationary issues for both of the techniques. The stationary condition 
is required for ARDL system, which is the first step of Agenor and Taylor (1993) methodology. 
The stationary condition for all the variables has been tested, and founded that almost all of the 
variables a highly statistically stationary from the first order, however CPI is found to be I(2) (see 
Appendix Table 1).  
Explaining spread between exchange rates conditional on fundamentals only makes sense 
when they are not cointegrated. If the CB sets exchange rate in a response to the market, then they 
are might be cointegrated. There are can be several examples of CB responses such as devaluating 
official exchange rate in order to promote export, or even CB can actively participate in emergence 
of black market in order to sell foreign currencies to finance budget deficits. But if CB sets 
exchange rate regardless what the market is doing, than it is basically policy variable that CB takes 
the value whichever it wants, and therefore is not necessarily that official exchange rate 
cointegrated with black market exchange rate. In order series to be cointegrated they have to follow 
unit root process. Table 2 in Appendix shows the results of panel unit root test for each black 
market and official exchange rate. Under the null hypothesis of unit root the results show that the 
series are stationary, suggesting that there is no cointegration between two variables. 
4.1. Kalman Filter 
Following Agenor and Taylor (1993) methodology we performed first and second ARDL 
systems for 20 countries to derive residuals from equation (4) and to use as a proxy for credibility 
shock   𝑐𝑡.  
The second part of the model is to estimate a backward-looking process for inflation with 
parameters varying with the non-fundamental component of the parallel market premium, using 
Kalman filter approach. The coefficient of credibility variable 𝛾 from equation (7) is negative, as 
predicted by the model, and statistically significant only for Austria, Brazil, Denmark, Japan, 
Netherland, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland (See Appendix 
Table 3). Fig 1 shows the behavior of the coefficient 𝛼𝑡 for countries for which 𝛾 gamma 
coefficient has been found statistically significant. In general, figure 1 depict that backward-
looking expectations in the most countries are likely to decline over the time.  In fact, the 
persistence effect in the most of the countries declined dramatically starting from the end of 1984 
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until 1986 and 1988. However, after 1988 we can observe modest increase in persistence effect in 
most of the countries, significantly for Netherland, Portugal, Brazil. Note that, the nine out of 
eleven countries are OECD countries. Therefore, it is consistent with fact that, the broad stability 
of nominal non-oil commodity prices and the sharp declines in real prices from 1984 to early 1987 
contributed to further disinflation in the OECD area and caused to inflation expectations to decline 
(Coe, Durand and Stiehler,1990).  Therefore, these suspicious results motivated us to employ the 
panel VAR analysis to address similar question: whether decline in inflation persistence due to 
increase in monetary policy credibility or due to another reason.  
Figure 1: Inflation persistence, dynamics of  𝛂𝐭 coefficient. 
 
 
 
Finally, in order to explain the reason for variations in average credibility across countries 
we plot intercept from ARDL system, interpreted as average level of credibility, and Central Bank 
Autonomy index (Arnone et al., 2007) in figure 2. We found positive correlation between Central 
Bank Autonomy (Overall) and average level of credibility, indicating that, the more Autonomy the 
more credible Central bank policy will be.  
Our conclusion from Kalman Filter analysis is that, inflation persistence declined over the 
time due to credible monetary policy. However, taking into account disinflation periods also 
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associated with other macroeconomic improvements, which can effect positively to disinflation 
process, it is hard to argue that, persistence effect declined only due to credible monetary policy. 
Therefore, following Pedroni (2008) and Pedroni (2013) we applied panel VAR analysis to 
disentangle the inflation, credibility and monetary policy shocks.  
 
3.2. Reduced form Panel VAR results 
Reduced form panel VAR applied to answer the following questions: (i) what is the median 
response of the inflation rate to a country –specific premium shock? (ii) How the responses of 
inflation due to premium shocks differ from premium shock? (iii) How much cross-country 
variation is there in this response? (iv) What factors determine the response of the inflation to 
credibility shocks across countries? 
3.2.1. Impulse responses and variance decomposition 
In this section we in particular we are interested in response of inflation to credibility shock 
as well as monetary policy and inflation shock. Figure 3 and 4 reports impulse responses of 
inflation due to premium shocks in higher and lower income13 countries respectively. The main 
                                                          
13 Grouping the countries by Higher and lower income based on level of GDP per capita income. In 
particular the countries with lower than 15,000 $ GDP per capita  at least in half of the time span 
considered as lower income countries, otherwise higher income countries. Lower income countries are 
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conclusion from figure 3 is that, premium shock, interpreted possible credibility shock, on average 
reduces inflation in higher income countries.  
 
In lower income countries, however, premium shocks cause to increase inflation as 
depicted in figure 4. Moreover, in 1st quarter there is a reduction in inflation, then inflation 
dramatically increases, that is, credibility shock doesn’t cause to reduce inflation even causes to 
increase, reflecting the explosive behavior of prices when policy credibility is low. Initial reduction 
can be explained by several hypotheses such as temporariness hypothesis, sticky prices etc.14 
                                                          
Brazil, Chile, Korea, Mexico, Portugal, South Africa, Spain and Turkey. Whereas higher income 
countries are Austria, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, Netherland,  New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. 
14 In more detail for this phenomenon see Rebelo and Vegh (1997) 
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Figure 5 reports the median as well as the 25th and 75th percentile fractions of the variance 
in the inflation rate that is explained by the credibility shocks. On average, country specific 
credibility shocks explain about 8-10% of the variation in the inflation over 22 periods. Another 
point is that, there is significant variation across countries. Thus, in the 1st quarter variation ranges 
from close to 0 to 5 percent, in the 22 quarters response period ranges from 2% to 33%.15 
                                                          
15 The impulse responses and variance decompositions for all the other variables in the system are 
provided in the Appendix C (Figure C1 and C2) 
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3.2.2. Comparison of the shocks 
In this subsection we analyze the response of inflation to different type of shocks. 
Particularly we are interested how much response of inflation to credibility shocks differs from 
change in inflation shock or monetary policy shock. Figure 6, shows that response of inflation to 
inflation shock16 and combination of change in inflation shock and premium shock are not 
significantly different, that is, the effects starts and ends in the same period of time, but has a bigger 
transitory peak response, presumably due to the expectation effect of the credibility shock.  
However, these results are not consistent with Kalman Filter results, in a sense that, VAR analysis 
shows that credibility shocks are not different from inflation shocks.  
                                                          
16 Impulse response of inflation with confidence intervals depicted in Appendix A, Figure 7. 
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Impulse responses of inflation due to credibility shock are depicted in figure 8.  The graph 
shows that impulse responses are statistically insignificant. However, results are mainly due to fact 
that, impulse responses of some countries are negative while others positive, in other word the 
graph shows heterogeneity among impulse responses of the countries.17 
 
3.2.3. Variation across countries in impulse responses 
Another central question could be what are the reasons cross-country variations of 
responses of inflation due to premium shocks? To answer this question, we examined the role of 
                                                          
17 In fact, bootstrapping method applied to build confidence interval for each countries impulse responses, and 
founded that, impulse responses are significant for most of the countries. 
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specific country characteristics to explain the cross-country pattern in the responses of inflation to 
credibility shocks. 
In particular we tried to test hypothesis that central bank autonomy the main determinant 
of credibility of monetary policy (Cukierman, 1992; Walsh, 1994). We used three kind of central 
bank autonomy indicator developed by Arnone et al. (2007) political autonomy, economic 
autonomy and overall autonomy. The results depicted in figure 5a-5c. Each figure has six plots 
showing the bivariate relationship between the six impulse responses (four quarters, average and 
the minimum). The main rationale about central autonomy hypothesis is that, the more central 
bank has independence the more credible will be monetary policy, thus lower inflation rate. 
Findings show that, in overall there is negative correlation between central bank autonomy and 
impulse responses, depicted in figure 2a. However, when we disentangle the autonomy to political 
and economic autonomy, we found slightly different results. For first quarter response political 
autonomy plays more roles in reduction inflation. In second and third quarters’ the effects are not 
different significantly in both type of autonomy. We need to notice that this shows more correlation 
rather than causation. Moreover, due to lack of sufficient number of countries it is hard to argue 
that these variations in the impulse responses across countries are systematic.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Despite the abundance of empirical paper on black market exchange rate dynamics, only 
few studies emphasized relationship between central bank credibility and black market exchange 
rate premia in empirical context. The major goal of this study was analyze the effect of 
“credibility” shocks to the dynamics of inflation persistence in 20 countries using quarterly data 
for the period 1980-1998. We employed two econometric techniques: Kalman Filter methodology 
following Agenor and Taylor (1992), and panel VAR approach following Pedroni (2008) and 
Pedroni (2013). 
 Our conclusion form Kalman Filter analyses is that, inflation persistence has declined for 
the overtime due to credible monetary policy. However, from panel VAR analysis we found 
different results. Impulse response analyses show that inflation does not respond significantly to 
premium shock compared to inflation shock.  In that sense, the results of panel VAR analysis are 
not consistent with Kalman Filter technique following Agenor and Taylor (1993) methodology. 
The reason for that could be due to univariate structure of the model in Kalman Filter methodology. 
22 
 
Thus, it could be difficult to distinguish between changes in the goodness-of-fit of the time-series 
model generating expectations and changes in the credibility of policy, because potentially relevant 
variables are excluded from the model. In contrast multivariate structure panel VAR approach 
allows us to build model conditional on past values of inflation. 
Moreover, we also found some evidence that CB independence could be important 
institutional reform to increase credibility of monetary policy.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table 1 : Unit Root Test Results (ADF) 
 
Variables Countries 
In the Level In the difference 
Trend Actual value Trend Actual value 
Parallel 
Market 
Premium  
Australia  -5.358417***   
Austria  -6.111163***   
Brazil  -2.884532*   
Canada  -4.775068***   
Chile  -2.942980  -7.323494*** 
Denmark  -4.701050**   
France  -2.364190  -9.468905*** 
Italy  -2.873819*   
Japan  -6.749618***   
Korea  -4.350478**   
Mexico  -4.478148**   
Netherland  -4.787664***   
New-Zealand  -3.771604**   
Norway  -5.888806***   
Portugal  -3.755724**   
South Africa  -3.718003**   
Spain  -1.857663  -9.351654*** 
Sweden  -4.211596**   
Switzerland  -4.129660**   
Turkey  -4.483149***   
CPI 
Australia  -1.995094 yes -3.234399** 
Austria  -1.627267  -5.721135*** 
Brazil  -0.317080  -2.901407 ** 
Canada yes -1.517252 yes -4.978334*** 
Chile  -2.241446 yes -5.907617*** 
Denmark yes -4.003842*** yes -7.657631 
France   yes -3.621430** 
Italy   yes -3.046197** 
Japan   yes -3.264668** 
Korea   yes -5.858173*** 
Mexico   yes -3.357530* 
Netherland   yes -2.315976 
New-Zealand yes 0.292493 yes -4.830880 
Norway   yes -7.044517*** 
Portugal   yes -3.409941* 
Portugal   yes -3.409941* 
South Africa   yes -6.674167*** 
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Spain   yes -2.306936 
Sweden  -1.826437 yes -4.955740 
Switzerland   yes -1.762769 
Turkey   yes -10.15641*** 
M2 
Australia  4.472538  -2.547894* 
Austria  2.824197  -7.121691*** 
Brazil  1.613373  -4.225407** 
Canada  -1.735049  -5.398428*** 
Chile  0.888847  -7.583921*** 
Denmark  -0.746546  -8.568184*** 
France  -1.811186  -6.531582*** 
Italy  -1.241890  -7.317039*** 
Japan  3.931652  -3.483846** 
Korea  1.084913  -8.247630*** 
Mexico  1.678208  -3.167133** 
Netherland  -0.519123  -8.579485*** 
New-Zealand  0.688815  -5.626185*** 
Norway  0.300968  -9.941589*** 
Portugal  1.663842  -6.607955*** 
South Africa  5.541025  1.05207* 
Spain  2.245019  -2.321617** 
Sweden  1.054487  -8.860800*** 
Switzerland  -0.118435  -4.198164*** 
Turkey  2.435724  -2.040976 
GDP 
Australia yes 2.875432  -6.509464*** 
Austria yes 1.228246  -9.427109*** 
Brazil yes -0.192542  -10.43885*** 
Canada yes -0.228367  -4.230944*** 
Chile yes 0.701638  -7.990145*** 
Denmark yes 0.314195  -8.866857*** 
France yes 0.620526  -6.804963*** 
Italy yes 0.030066  -8.092096*** 
Japan yes -1.929288  -2.842870** 
Korea yes -0.188234  -6.111443*** 
Mexico yes 0.365206  -6.264288*** 
Netherland yes 2.746825  -7.901333*** 
New Zealand yes -0.333415  -9.686997*** 
Norway yes 1.437692  -12.07066*** 
Portugal yes 1.589725  -11.51867*** 
South Africa yes -0.561012  -4.485468** 
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Table 2: Panel Unit Root Test 
Variables 
# of 
Countries 
Panel Unit Root test 
Levin-Lin Im-Pesaran-Shin 
Rho-stat t-rho-stat ADF-stat ADF-stat 
Black Market 
exchange rate 
20 -4.00 -1.79 -1.25 -1.82 
Official Exchange 
rate 
20 -3.17 -1.87 -0.83 -0.92 
Notes: Variables test in logarithms. The tests are based on Pedroni (1999, 2004) and test 
statistics a normally distributed.  
 
Table 3: Statistical results for credibility variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Spain yes 0.090432  -2.656618** 
Sweden yes 0.738013  -12.28401*** 
Switzerland yes -1.420578  -5.326300*** 
Turkey yes -0.278718  -7.721464*** 
Country Coefficient Stand. Error Prob 
Australia -4.750416 5.508526 0.3885 
Austria -7.256333** 0.293844 0.0427 
Brazil -1.649216*** 0.345909 0.0000 
Canada -8.090274 17.24283 0.6389 
Chile -0.447057 2.815038 0.8738 
Denmark -9.596492* 4.904062 0.0504 
France -0.793646 4.174737 0.8492 
Italy -2.698765 5.682623 0.6348 
Japan -7.557352* 4.045325 0.0617 
Korea -3.729321 3.335928 0.2636 
Mexico -1.218541 2.051466 0.5525 
Netherlands -4.880586* 2.943818 0.0973 
New Zealand -1.856738 6.695094 0.6982 
Norway -3.046939** 1.368755 0.0260 
Portugal  -2.492947** 1.076437 0.0206 
South Africa -1.280133** 0.570541 0.0249 
Spain -3.851798** 1.688165 0.0225 
Sweden -3.470358** 1.489922 0.0198 
Switzerland -10.78241** 4.265110 0.0115 
Turkey -0.531808 2.428126 0.8266 
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Figure 7 : Response of Inflation to Premium plus Inflation Shock 
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Figure 9 a. Impulse Responses of inflation (due to premium shocks) and Overall C.B. Autonomy 
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Figure 9b. Impulse Responses of inflation (due to premium shocks) and C.B. Economic Autonomy 
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Figure 9c. Impulse Responses of inflation (due to premium shocks) and C.B. Political 
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Appendix B. 
 
Table 5. Sample Coverage 
Country name WB code Start time End time 
Austrlia AUS 1980q1 1998q4 
Austria AUT 1980q1 1998q4 
Brazil BRA 1980q1 1998q4 
Canada CAN 1980q1 1998q4 
Chile CHL 1980q1 1998q4 
Denmark DNK 1980q1 1998q4 
France FRA 1980q1 1998q4 
Italy ITA 1980q1 1998q4 
Japan JPN 1980q1 1998q4 
Korea KOR 1980q1 1998q4 
Mexico MEX 1980q1 1998q4 
Netherland NLD 1980q1 1998q4 
New Zealand NZL 1980q1 1998q4 
Norway NOR 1980q1 1998q4 
Portugal PRT 1980q1 1998q4 
South Africa ZAF 1980q1 1998q4 
Spain ESP 1980q1 1998q4 
Sweden SWE 1980q1 1998q4 
Switzerland CHE 1980q1 1998q4 
Turkey TUR 1980q1 1998q4 
 
Table 6. Table Data Sources 
Vairable Data Source 
M1 (Zew Zealand) Federal Reserve New Zealand 
M1 (for all other countries) IFS  
CPI IFS  
GDP IFS  
Official and Black Market 
exchnage rates 
 Carmen Reinhart Web-site 
http://www.carmenreinhart.com/user_uploads/data/33_data.xls 
Central Bank Indepedence 
Index 
Cuckierman (2004) 
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Appendix C. 
Figure C1. 
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Figure C2. 
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